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Abstract
The context of a famous novel by Milan Kundera (Immortality) suggests that when faced with a life-or-death situation, every woman
would prefer to save her child than her husband, left hanging whether every man would do the same. We labeled this as the
Kundera hypothesis, and the purpose of this study was to test it empirically as we believe it raises a thought-provoking question in
evolutionary terms. Specifically, 197 college students (92 women) were presented a questionnaire where they had to make
different decisions about four dilemmas about who to save (their mate or their offspring) in two hypothetical life-or-death
situations: a home fire and a car crash. These dilemmas involved two different mate ages (a 25- or a 40-year-old mate) and two
offspring ages (1- or a 6-year-old child). For comparative purposes, we also included complementary life-or-death dilemmas on
both a sibling and an offspring, and a sibling and a cousin. The results generally supported the Kundera hypothesis: Although the
majority of men and women made the decision to save their offspring instead of their mate, about 18% of men on average (unlike
the 5% of women) consistently decided to save their mate across the four dilemmas in the two life-or-death situations. These data
were interpreted with reference to Hamilton’s inclusive fitness theory, the preferential role of women as kin keepers, and the
evolution of altruism toward friends and mates.
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“At the very same moment that Professor Avenarius was put-
ting on his socks, Agnes was remembering the following sen-
tence: ‘Every woman prefers her child to her husband.’ Her
mother said that to her, in a confidential tone (in circumstances
now forgotten) when Agnes was about twelve or thirteen years
old” (Kundera, 1991, Immortality, p. 258). Given a critical
situation, would a woman always prefer her child to her hus-
band, as Kundera’s novel character suggests? And conversely,
as one might well implicitly infer, would a man prefer his wife
to his child, at least sometimes? This is the core question at the
center of what we have informally called the Kundera hypoth-
esis, and testing it empirically is the main purpose of the pres-
ent study. From an evolutionary perspective, we think that this
hypothesis can be theoretically framed in the context of at least
three significant sources of literature: kin altruism, as shaped
by Hamilton’s inclusive fitness theory; the preferential role of
women as “kin keepers” (compared to men); and the evolution
of altruism toward friends and mates.
Kin Altruism and Inclusive Fitness Theory
Hamilton’s (1964) inclusive fitness theory (but also see contri-
butions by Fisher, 1930; Haldane, 1932; Maynard Smith, 1964)
has been considered one of the most important extensions of
Darwin’s theory in the last century and is the basis of any
significant explanation of social evolution in modern biology.
It has had a substantial influence on our understanding of
human behavior in fields such as altruism, family psychology,
group formation, and aggression, among others (Buss, 2015;
West & Gardner, 2013). As widely known, Hamilton’s theory
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emphasizes the relevance of the degree of genetic relatedness
for fitness over the role of reproductive individual success as
typically pointed out by Darwin, by providing an evolutionarily
consistent explanation to the “problem of altruism,” at least in
the realm of kin relations.
Empirical evidence in favor of inclusive fitness theory in the
psychology field, particularly altruism and social exchange,
has been overwhelming in recent decades as it has sometimes
exceeded the predictive power of any purely psychological
theory on altruism in social psychology (see, e.g., Burnstein,
Crandall, & Kitayama, 1994). Research into mammals and
other nonhuman species (e.g., Alcock, 1993; Silk, 2002),
ethnographic records in non-Western societies (e.g., Betzig,
Borgerhoft Mulder, & Turke, 1988; Chagnon & Irons, 1979),
historical records in Western countries from the 15th to the
19th century (e.g., Becker, 1991; Voland, Siegelkow, & Engel,
1991), cross-cultural data on grief and mourning (e.g., Rosen-
blatt, Walsh, & Jackson, 1976), records about ancient and con-
temporary natural disasters (e.g., Drabek, Key, Erickson, &
Crowe, 1975; Grayson, 1993; McCullough & Barton, 1991),
data on inheritance distributions (e.g., Smith, Kish, &
Crawford, 1987), stepparenting and parental uncertainty liter-
ature (e.g., Anderson, Kaplan, & Lancaster, 1999, 2007; Daly
&Wilson, 1982, 1988), and research on full sibling versus half-
sibling relationships (e.g., Jankowiak & Diderich, 2000; Pollet,
2007) clearly point out the significant bias toward kin (vs.
nonkin), particularly close kin (vs. distant kin), when referring
to helping behaviors and/or altruistic acts, which agrees with
inclusive fitness theory.
Women as Kin Keepers
Most literature focused on studying the potential differences
between men and women regarding family can be summarized
as follows: “ . . . females are much more likely to keep track of
kin and are more concerned about their welfare than men”
(Hames, 2015, p. 518). In fact, it has been shown that women
recall more relatives than men within their particular genealogy
(but see Chagnon, 1988, for an exception with Yanomamo
traditional society), and that family seems more important for
women’s personal identity than for men’s (Salmon & Daly,
1996). It has also been pointed out that women’s attention to
kin network formation and maintenance across their lifetime,
particularly at middle and older ages, is substantially better
than that of men, which is generally more directed to nonkin
networks (Benenson et al., 2009; Neyer & Lang, 2003; Scelza,
2009). The grandparent solicitude literature also clearly indi-
cates that grandchildren feel more close to, and get more
attention and resources from their grandmothers, than they do
from their grandfathers (see, e.g., Euler & Weitzel, 1996).
Something similar happens with matrilinear aunts and uncles
(Gaulin, McBurney, & Brakerman-Wartell, 1997). Not surpris-
ingly, the presence of a grandmother, or even a firstborn daugh-
ter, who can play an alloparenting role, and the size of the
maternal kin network have often been found to be related to
both higher survival and better health among women’s
offspring and also to a narrower interbirth interval (Hadley,
2004; Hames & Draper, 2004; Hawkes, O’Connell, & Blurton
Jones, 1997; Snopkowski & Sear, 2013). Therefore, it seems
tenable to hypothesize that family plays a more central role for
women, compared to men, in terms of their inclusive fitness.
Altruism Toward Friends and Mates
From an evolutionary perspective, Trivers’s (1971) theory of
reciprocal altruism is for nonkin altruism what inclusive fitness
theory is for kin altruism. Basically, Trivers’s theory proposes
that among nonkin, the rule of thumb for understanding altru-
ism is tit-for-tat; that is, the near future reciprocation by the
receiver of an altruist act in favor of the donor of that act (but
see, e.g., Nowak, 2006; Zahavi, 1995, for alternative explana-
tions). However, there are two specific cases, friends and
mates, where the understanding of altruistic acts seems to fall
between inclusive fitness theory and reciprocal altruism theory.
In fact, it has been pointed out that some nonkin categories
seem to be an exception to the leading rule that people support
kin more than nonkin (e.g., Stewart-Williams, 2007). Paradoxi-
cally, an immediate reciprocation orientation in friendship or
marriage has been found to be associated with a feeling of a
true friendship lacking or with marital dissatisfaction and neg-
ative marriage expectations (Shackelford & Buss, 1996).
Regarding friends, a classic study by Essock-Vitale and
McGuire (1985), about patterns of helping in a group of 300
Caucasian middle-class middle-aged Los Angeles women,
revealed that, beyond kin, close friends are often the benefi-
ciary and contributors of help. In their study 1, Burnstein,
Crandall, and Kitayama (1994) also report that step-kin might
be more probably the receiver of an altruist act in a hypothetical
life-or-death situation than an acquaintance and emphasize the
potential role of culture in defining the nature of some relation-
ships. More recently, Stewart-Williams (2007, 2008) has
shown that in high-cost hypothetical help situations (e.g., in
response to a request for donating a kidney to someone who
needs it), siblings are more likely selected as help recipients
than friends; however, in low-cost real help situations (e.g., to
have actually given emotional support to someone in an every-
day situation) the reverse is the case: Friends are more often the
recipients of help than siblings (Steward-Williams also reports
that in medium-cost real help situations, such as providing true
financial support to someone, friends are the beneficiaries of
help as often as siblings.) Perhaps not surprisingly, young
adults usually feel emotionally closer to friends than to siblings
(Korchmaros & Kenny, 2001, 2006; Kruger, 2003; Steward-
Williams, 2008), although this may change as they age (see,
e.g., Neyer & Lang, 2003).
Less attention has been paid to mates or romantic partners’
altruism, either as itself or as being related to kin and friends’
altruism. To our knowledge, only two studies have addressed
this issue (Neyer & Lang, 2003; Steward-Williams, 2008).
Although one might initially think that, in evolutionary terms,
a mate is more valuable than a friend, but less than kin, the
results of these two studies consistently indicate that overall
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people feel emotionally closer to, and receive more help from,
their mates than from anyone else, including kin. According to
Steward-Williams (2008), it should be of no surprise that altru-
ism toward mates is greater than toward friends as mates are
both friends and sexual partners who can potentially share off-
spring and, thus, attain a surrogate kin status. In fact, in his
study, Steward-Williams states that the amount of help
received from siblings and mates is comparable, and in both
cases, it is greater than the help received from friends, but only
when the cost of help is hypothetically high. When the cost of
help is low or medium, subjects report to have received signif-
icantly more help from mates than from both siblings and
friends. In addition, as Steward-Williams (2008) points out,
altruism between mates is indirectly beneficial for their chil-
dren, as well as a sign for the two members of a potential long-
term couple of a suitable partnership and also of the likely
successful cooperation as parents in the future.
In the same vein, Neyer and Lang (2003) report similar
results, but this time not only with a sample of college students,
as Steward-Williams (2008) does, but with a much bigger sam-
ple with individuals aged from 20 to more than 65 years old.
According to these authors, the prevalence of altruism toward
mates is grounded in the fact that a romantic partnership is
basically an attachment relation and is evolutionary critical for
reproductive success (see also, e.g., Zeifman & Hazan, 1997),
which becomes a quasikin relationship in practice. To support
their arguments, Neyer and Lang (2003) also report that only
among singles, particularly as they age, does altruism toward
kin continue to be strong.
The Current Study
Overall, contemporary research reveals, on the one hand, that
Hamilton’s theory of inclusive fitness constitutes a suitable
framework to understand altruistic behavior in humans, partic-
ularly among kin. On the other hand, it also indicates that kin
networks seem more meaningful for women than for men,
whereas friends and mates remain the two potential exceptions
to Hamilton’s rule. In fact, in high-cost help situations, altruism
toward close relatives and mates is typically greater than altru-
ism toward other distant kin and friends. It is not clear, however,
what happens if individuals have to make a decision in a dra-
matic life situation between a close relative and a mate. Namely,
the dilemma between an offspring and a mate is that faced by
what we call the Kundera hypothesis, which suggests this would
be rather a gender-biased decision, with women more likely to
save their children than their mates to a greater extent that men.
Based on current evidence, which emphasizes the role of woman
as primary kin keepers, this might well be the case.
In order to test this hypothesis, we designed a short ques-
tionnaire where approximately the same number of women and
men were asked about their initial decision about two hypothe-
tical life-or-death situations (a home fire and a car crash),
where both a mate and an offspring would be involved, other
than themselves. No information about the gender of either the
mate or offspring was provided, although we did provide
information about age (with two different ages attributed to
mates, 25 and 40 years old, and offspring, 1 and 6 years old).
This made provided four different combinations to test whether
the reproductive value of both (higher for the younger mate and
the older offspring and lower for the older mate and the
younger offspring) may influence decision-making. For con-
trol, and also distracting, purposes (i.e., what we were actually
looking for was not too obvious for the participants), we
included two additional dilemmas to be solved in the question-
naire, involving a sibling versus an offspring (r ¼ .50) and a
sibling versus a cousin (r ¼ .125) in equivalent life-or-death
situations (an earthquake and an avalanche for the sibling vs.
offspring dilemmas; a train derailment and a boat sinking for
the sibling vs. cousin dilemmas). Two different ages were also
attributed to each pair replicating roughly the mate versus off-
spring ages dilemma (siblings: 25 and 40 years old; cousins: 15
and 35 years old). We adjusted the ages of first cousins to make
them feasible for the average of our intended sample’s age (i.e.,
about 20-year-old college students).
We first hypothesized that both men and woman would
make the decision to save their offspring more often than their
mates. In the end, and based on Hamilton’s theory, offsprings
are close kin with a .50 degree of relatedness. However, fol-
lowing the Kundera hypothesis, we hypothesized that this trend
would be more pronounced in women than in men, with more
men making the decision to save their mates instead of their
offspring than women. We also expected this trend to be modu-
lated by the age of both mates and offspring in men, with a
higher tendency to save their mate, the younger the mate and
their offspring were (i.e., 25-year-old mate vs. 1-year-old off-
spring dilemma, where a mate’s highest reproductive value is
contrasted with an offspring’s lowest reproductive value). Con-
versely, we expected there would be a lower tendency to save
their mate in the reverse situation (i.e., when both the mate and
offspring are older: 40-year-old mate vs. 6-year-old offspring
dilemmas), where a mate’s lowest reproductive value, particu-
larly in women, is contrasted with an offspring’s highest repro-
ductive value.
Method
Participants
The sample consisted of 197 college students (92 women and
105 men; Mage ¼ 21.1 years, SD ¼ 3 years) who attended a
public urban university in eastern Spain and volunteered for
this study. They were taking classes at the School of Psychol-
ogy or the College of Education (37.6%), the School of Eco-
nomics and Business Administration (23.4%), or the School of
Technology (37.6%). Their socioeconomic status was mainly
middle class, typical of most college students in Spain.
Questionnaire and Procedure
The participants were tested in groups in their university class-
rooms through a brief paper-and-pencil questionnaire
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composed of 24 questions. Prior to delivering the question-
naire, the participants were told that they would find a series
of risk situations where an unforeseen accident had taken place,
and they would need to decide between two options. We also
insisted on (1) the questionnaire being completely anonymous
(only birth date and gender information were collected), so that
no one could identify their individual responses, (2) there being
no correct or incorrect answers, (3) it being important not to
leave any blank questions despite the temptation to do so, and
(4) it being advisable not to spend a long-time thinking about
each question (although they were also told that there was no
time limit to complete the questionnaire). We conveyed this
information first verbally and that it was also available on the
front page of the questionnaire booklet.
Every question of the 24 presented a different hypothetical
situation involving the participant and two other people where
an accident risking the lives of them all had suddenly taken
place, and the participant had to make a life-or-death decision
about which of these two persons to save. During the question-
naire, we systematically varied the degree of genetic related-
ness of the two people regarding the participant, the age of
these two people, and the kind of accident that they were all
involved in. More specifically, in eight of the questions, the
two people accompanying the participant were his or her mate
and an offspring (this was the real target of this study; degree of
genetic relatedness with the participant ¼ 0 and 0.5, respec-
tively); in another eight questions, those people were a partici-
pant’s sibling and a participant’s offspring (degree of genetic
relatedness with the participant ¼ .50 in both cases); and in the
remaining eight questions, a participant’s sibling and a partici-
pant’s cousin were involved in the accident (degree of genetic
relatedness with the participant ¼ .50 and .125, respectively).
Hypothetical mates, offspring, siblings, and cousins also var-
ied, as mentioned before, as regard their age. Thus, they could
be younger or older (i.e., a 25- or a 40-year-old mate, a 1- or a
6-year-old offspring, a 25- or a 40-year-old sibling, a 15- or a
35-year-old cousin). This resulted in four different combina-
tions for all three blocks of comparisons (e.g., a 25-year-old
mate vs. a 1-year-old offspring, a 25-year-old mate vs. a 6-year-
old offspring, a 40-year-old mate vs. a 1-year-old offspring,
and a 40-year-old mate vs. a 6-year-old offspring). Every spe-
cific combination within each block was presented twice in the
context of two different critical situations: home fire and car
crash for the mate versus offspring combinations, earthquake
and avalanche for the sibling versus offspring combinations,
and trail derailment and boat sinking for the sibling versus
cousin combinations.
The presentation order of the 24 questions was not obvi-
ously made by blocks but randomly by mixing all three differ-
ent combinations of participants’ companions and the six
life-or-dead situations. The structure and writing of each
question was similar. For example, “You are at home with your
25-year-old sibling and your 1-year-old offspring. Then all of a
sudden an earthquake happens and both are trapped in different
rooms of your apartment. But you only have the time and
resources to help one of them to escape from the building.
We know this is a difficult decision to make, but remember
you can only save one of them. Who would you save?” Then
the participant had to make his or her choice between the two
displayed people’s options.
Results
We first computed the number of participants who decided to
save each of the two people involved in every specific combi-
nation and life-or-death situation. In order to see whether there
were any significant gender differences, we applied a series of
w2 tests of independence (1, N ¼ 197), replaced with a Fisher’s
exact test when cell distributions were extremely unequal. As
we can see in Table 1, most of the subjects preferred to save
their offspring than their mates or siblings, and their siblings
than their cousins. However, only in the offspring versus mate
combinations were gender differences significant and consis-
tent in decision-making, with women saving their offspring
more often than men consistently across the different age com-
binations and situations or, in another words, with a few more
men in all these age combinations and situations preferring to
save their mates instead of their offspring. There were also two
sporadic, but significant, gender differences in the sibling ver-
sus cousin dilemmas, but they were inconsistent across the two
tested life-or-death situations.
In order to analyze the potential influence of the mate’s age
in decision-making, we focused only on those participants who
consistently made the decision to save their mate over their
offspring in the two life-or-death situations and set aside those
participants who only saved their mates in one situation, but not
in the other. We did the same in the two other dilemmas regard-
ing the participants who consistently decided, or did not, to save
their sibling over their offspring and their cousin over their sib-
ling. In Tables 2 and 3, we can respectively see the percentage/
number and the distribution of those participants in our sample,
which were consistent and inconsistent. By making this distinc-
tion, we increased, on the one hand, the strength of our results
with regard to the potential age effects obtained from our ana-
lyses as they were based conservatively only on those subjects
who were consistent in their decisions across situations. On the
other hand, by inspecting the inconsistent subjects’ responses,
we had a chance to roughly estimate the degree of decision-
making difficulty experienced by the participants across the
different dilemmas. We considered that an inspection of incon-
sistencies could play a similar role as reaction times regarding the
analyses of cognitive processes with, for example, more incon-
sistencies about a certain dilemma, but not about another, which
would reveal a higher degree of hesitation about that dilemma.
To examine the potential influence of the mate’s age on the
decision-making for consistent participants, we performed a
series of McNemar tests by contrasting the four age combina-
tions. We first conducted a series of analyses, including the
responses of both men and women, and then a second series
of analyses specifically for men and women’s responses. For
the mate versus offspring dilemma in general (1, N ¼ 173), we
found significant differences between the 25-year-old mate
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versus 1-year-old offspring dilemma and the other three dilem-
mas (p  .004, M25 vs. 1 ¼ 16.2 > M25 vs. 6 ¼ 11 ¼ M40 vs. 1 ¼
9.2¼M40 vs. 6¼ 8.1). Specifically, for men’s responses (1, n¼
86), we found significant differences between the 25-year-old
mate versus 1-year-old offspring dilemma and the two dilem-
mas involving the 40-year-old mate (p ¼ .008 in both cases,
M25 vs. 1¼ 23.3 >M40 vs. 1/6¼ 14). For women’s responses (1, n
¼ 87), only one significant difference was found between the
25-year-old mate versus 1-year-old offspring and the 40-year-
old versus 6-year-old offspring dilemma (p ¼ .031, M25 vs. 1 ¼
9.2 > M40 vs. 6 ¼ 2.3).
We also tested for differences between decisions to save a
25- versus a 40-year-old-mate for both men and women by
collapsing data across the two offspring conditions (1- and
6-year-old) regarding the number of times that each participant
had saved their mates. For this analysis, we selected only those
participants who had saved consistently their mates across the
two life-or-death situations presented in at least one of the four
dilemmas conditions; that is, 19 men and 8 women, score range
¼ 2–8 times. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests indicated that for both
cases, men and women, 25-year-old mates were saved a sig-
nificantly higher number of times than 40-year-old mates (men,
M25 ¼ 3.7 > M40 ¼ 2.5, and women, M25 ¼ 2.8 > M40 ¼ 1.5;
Z ¼ 2.4 and 2.2, respectively; p < .05).
Table 2. Percentage of Participants Who Consistently Indicated That
They Would Save Their Mate Over Their Offspring in Both the Home
Fire and Car Crash Situations (N ¼ 173, 86 Men and 87 Women);
Their Siblings Over their Offspring in Both the Earthquake and Ava-
lanche Situations (N ¼ 154, 83 Men and 71 Women); and Their Cou-
sins Over Their Siblings in Both the Train Derailment and Boat Sinking
Situations (N ¼ 152, 78 Men and 74 Women).
Dilemmas Men Women Mean
Mate 25 YO vs. offspring 1 YO 23.3 9.2 16.2
Mate 25 YO vs. offspring 6 YO 18.6 3.4 11.0
Mate 40 YO vs. offspring 1 YO 14.0 4.6 9.2
Mate 40 YO vs. offspring 6 YO 14.0 2.3 8.1
Mean 17.5 4.9 11.2
Sibling 25 YO vs. offspring 1 YO 13.3 8.5 11.0
Sibling 25 YO vs. offspring 6 YO 9.6 5.6 7.8
Sibling 40 YO vs. offspring 1 YO 9.6 8.5 9.1
Sibling 40 YO vs. offspring 6 YO 6.0 4.2 5.2
Mean 9.6 6.7 8.2
Sibling 25 YO vs. cousin 15 YO 11.5 10.8 11.2
Sibling 25 YO vs. cousin 35 YO 2.6 0.0 1.3
Sibling 40 YO vs. cousin 15 YO 30.8 27.0 28.9
Sibling 40 YO vs. cousin 35 YO 3.8 1.4 2.6
Mean 12.2 9.8 11.0
Note. YO ¼ year old.
Table 3. Number of Participants Who Inconsistently Indicated That
They Would Save Their Mate Over Their Offspring (n ¼ 22; 18 Men),
Their Siblings Over Their Offspring (n ¼ 43; 22 Men), and Their
Cousins Over Their Siblings (n ¼ 45; 27 Men) Depending on the Two
Live-or-Death Situations Displayed Per Dilemma.
Dilemmas Men Women Total
Mate 25 YO vs. offspring 1 YO 7 2 9
Mate 25 YO vs. offspring 6 YO 5 2 7
Mate 40 YO vs. offspring 1 YO 2 1 3
Mate 40 YO vs. offspring 6 YO 4 0 4
Total 18 (78%) 5 (22%) 23
Sibling 25 YO vs. offspring 1 YO 7 8 15
Sibling 25 YO vs. offspring 6 YO 7 11 18
Sibling 40 YO vs. offspring 1 YO 4 11 15
Sibling 40 YO vs. offspring 6 YO 8 5 13
Total 26 (43%) 35 (57%) 61
Sibling 25 YO vs. cousin 15 YO 9 6 15
Sibling 25 YO vs. cousin 35 YO 4 0 4
Sibling 40 YO vs. cousin 15 YO 8 10 18
Sibling 40 YO vs. cousin 35 YO 6 2 8
Total 27 (60%) 18 (40%) 45
Note. In the mates versus offspring dilemmas, and particularly in the siblings
versus offspring dilemmas, some subjects were inconsistent in more than one
specific comparison, which meant discrepancy between the number of
participants who were inconsistent and the total number of inconsistencies.
YO ¼ year old.
Table 1. Percentage of Subjects Who Indicated That They Would
Save Their Offspring Over Their Mates, Their Offspring Over Their
Sibling, and Their Sibling Over Their Cousins, in a Live-or-Death Sit-
uation (Home Fire, Car Crash, Earthquake, Avalanche, Train Derail-
ment, Boat Sinking).
Dilemmas Men Women Significance
Mate 25 YO vs. offspring 1 YO (1) 69.5 89.1 .001
Mate 25 YO vs. offspring 1 YO (2) 70.5 89.1 .001
Mate 25 YO vs. offspring 6 YO (1) 77.7 96.7 .000
Mate 25 YO vs. offspring 6 YO (2) 76.9 94.6 .001
Mate 40 YO vs. offspring 1 YO (1) 81.0 94.6 .004
Mate 40 YO vs. offspring 1 YO (2) 82.9 95.7 .004
Mate 40 YO vs. offspring 6 YO (1) 86.4 96.7 .011
Mate 40 YO vs. offspring 6 YO (2) 84.5 96.7 .004
Mean 78.7 94.2
Sibling 25 YO vs. offspring 1 YO (3) 77.7 82.6 .389
Sibling 25 YO vs. offspring 1 YO (4) 77.9 78.3 .949
Sibling 25 YO vs. offspring 6 YO (3) 84.6 88.0 .487
Sibling 25 YO vs. offspring 6 YO (4) 83.5 80.4 .578
Sibling 40 YO vs. offspring 1 YO (3) 87.6 87.0 .889
Sibling 40 YO vs. offspring 1 YO (4) 87.5 79.3 .123
Sibling 40 YO vs. offspring 6 YO (3) 92.4 93.5 .765
Sibling 40 YO vs. offspring 6 YO (4) 90.4 92.4 .618
Mean 85.2 85.2
Sibling 25 YO vs. cousin 15 YO (5) 89.5 83.7 .228
Sibling 25 YO vs. cousin 15 YO (6) 82.7 85.9 .543
Sibling 25 YO vs. cousin 35 YO (5) 94.2 100 .030a
Sibling 25 YO vs. cousin 35 YO (6) 98.1 100 .499a
Sibling 40 YO vs. cousin 15 YO (5) 63.8 65.2 .837
Sibling 40 YO vs. cousin 15 YO (6) 60.6 63.0 .723
Sibling 40 YO vs. cousin 35 YO (5) 95.2 97.8 .452a
Sibling 40 YO vs. cousin 35 YO (6) 89.4 97.8 .019
Mean 84.2 86.7
Note. Significance of gender differences calculated by w2 tests (1, N ¼ 197) or
Fisher’s exact test, indicated with a, in cases of an extremely unequal cell distri-
bution. Values whose p < .05 in bold. YO ¼ year old; 1 ¼ home fire, 2 ¼ car
crash, 3 ¼ earthquake, 4 ¼ avalanche, 5 ¼ train derailment, 6 ¼ boat sinking.
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In the examination of the inconsistent participants, we first
found for the mates versus offspring dilemma that only 22 par-
ticipants of the whole sample of 197 (11 %), 17 men (16 % of
the men’s sample) and 5 women (5 % of the women’s sample)
were inconsistent, but 43 and 45, respectively (22–23%), for
the other two dilemmas. Overall, 129 participants’ inconsisten-
cies were identified across the study, with some participants
(specifically 1 subject in the mates vs. offspring dilemma and
10 subjects in the siblings vs. offspring dilemma) being incon-
sistent in more than one of the four specific comparisons pre-
sented per dilemma; 18% of these inconsistencies
corresponded to the mates versus offspring dilemma. Finally,
an analysis of the distribution of the inconsistencies by each
one of the two life-or-death situations displayed per dilemma
indicated that this distribution was even for the mates versus
offspring dilemmas, with 11 participants (48 %) saving the
mate in the home fire situation, but not in the car crash situa-
tion, and 12 participants (42 %) doing the reverse.
Discussion
Daly (2015) recently stated: “Ask any sample of people who
they feel closest to, care the most about, would sacrifice the
most to help, and the bulk of the nominees will be either close
genetic relatives or the romantic partners of your respondents”
(p. 500). But what would happen if one had to choose between
a close genetic relative and a romantic partner in a life-or-death
situation? This was the core question at the center of the present
study, and according to what we informally called the
“Kundera hypothesis,” this response would be gender-biased:
For example, women always being more prone to save their
children than their mate and men not being necessarily that
clearly determined about what to do when faced with the same
dilemma.
The data found in this study are apparently compatible with
this hypothesis: Although most of both the tested women and
men were more prone to save their offspring than their mate in
a hypothetical life-or-death situation, every comparison pre-
sented more men who were significantly inclined to save their
mate instead of their offspring. On average, the number of men
who contemplated the possibility of saving their mates instead
of their offspring tripled the number of women. The analyses of
inconsistencies (the participants who decided to save their mate
in one of the two presented life-or-death situations but not in
the other) indicated that this was no easy decision to make.
Moreover, as hypothesized, we also found that decision-
making in this dilemma was mediated by age, with both men
and women preferring to save the 25-year-old mate signifi-
cantly more than the 40-year-old mate and more men preferring
to save their 25-year-old mate in contrast to their 1-year-old
offspring than their 40-year-old mate either against their 1- or
6-year-old offspring. Surprisingly enough to our prior predic-
tions, significantly more women preferred to save their
25-year-old mate against their 1-year-old offspring, than to
save their 40-year-old mate against their 6-year-old offspring.
This finding indicates that, in spite of the Kundera hypothesis
general confirmation, some women were not completely
immune in some specific, but minority, contexts to the counter-
intuitive feeling to save their mates instead of their own off-
spring. Finally, we found that most of the inconsistencies in this
dilemma concentrated in the 25-year-old mate versus 1- or
6-year-old offspring combinations. Once again, this probably
indicates the high level of hesitation and/or conflict experi-
enced by participants when having to make their decisions on
these two specific combinations.
The essence of the found results about this dilemma can be
easily interpreted following classic Hamilton’s arguments. In
the end, a vast majority of both men and women made the
decision in a critical situation to save those that better guaran-
teed their inclusive fitness, their offspring (r ¼ .50). Moreover,
both men and women modulated their decisions, sometimes
depending on the age of mate and offspring involved in the
comparisons, which would suggest that parental investment in
offspring (higher for a 6-year-old child than for a 1-year-old
child) and the mate’s reproductive value (higher for a 25-year-
old woman than for a 40-year-old woman) were somehow
implicated in the decisions that the participants made. How-
ever, the consummation of the Kundera hypothesis once again
confirms that Hamilton’s rule can also be affected by other
variables, like the closeness of some nonkin relationships, for
example, friendship or, particularly here, mating (as already
found in other studies; e.g., Neyer & Lang, 2003; Stewart-
Williams, 2007, 2008) and gender. The fact that roughly 3
times the number of men than women stated that they would
prefer to save their mates instead of their offspring in a life-or-
death situation could reveal that women have a stronger bias
toward family than men, which agrees with the “women as a
kin keeper” role described typically in the evolutionary litera-
ture (e.g., Hames, 2015), and they simply put family first when
faced with critical dilemmas like those presented herein.
Complementarily, or even alternatively, we think that it is
also possible to interpret findings in the Kundera hypothesis in
terms of Tooby and Cosmides’s (1996) arguments on the evo-
lution of friendship, with mates “becoming more irreplaceable”
for men than for women (or for some of them at least). This can
be done in such a way that, for example, although it might
sound harsh, some men may implicitly feel that losing a current
offspring, but keeping the mother of their near future ones, can
be a more effective strategy in inclusive terms than the reverse
one. On the contrary, for women who, whatever their offspring
age are, have already made a significant parental investment in
them, children have become systematically “more
irreplaceable” than mates. Yet, we should not overlook the fact
that the vast majority of men still preferred to save their off-
spring over their mates.
We still think that any of these interpretations can be taken
for granted in the present research state without further
explorations. For example, although gender bias toward saving
mates instead of offspring is pretty consistent across the differ-
ent age combinations and the presented two situations, it is no
less certain that some women also significantly saved more
their mates when facing a 25-year-old mate versus a 1-year-
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old offspring dilemma than when facing a 40-year-old mate
versus a 6-year-old offspring one. Therefore, even for women,
a mate does not always seem “more replaceable” than an off-
spring. Moreover, we should consider as regard the age effects
found in our study that the range of mates’ ages that we used
(25 and 40 years old) can have a quite different meaning in
inclusive fitness terms for men and women. Whereas a 25-year-
old mate for men can certainly have a higher reproductive
value than a 40-year-old mate (see, e.g., Symons, 1979; Wil-
liams, 1975), for women this difference might be not that
important, and this might explain why, for example, when a
1-year-old was involved in the life-or-death situations, men
significantly saved their mate more when she was 25 years old
than when she was 40 years old, but women did not. Finally, we
think that we should not consign to oblivion that most of our
sample was composed of very young people (21-year-olds on
average), and this fact might have also had an influence on our
results (e.g., showing a higher preference to save the younger
peer age mates than the older ones). Not surprisingly, previous
research has shown that young people may feel emotionally
closer to friends than to siblings (Steward-Williams, 2008), and
that helping behaviors toward kin and nonkin, including mates,
can vary noticeably as we grow older (Neyer & Lang, 2003).
Therefore, although the Kundera hypothesis seems to be a
new and potentially thought-provoking phenomena in the field,
questions about it remain unsolved: Why do some men make
the decision to save their mates over their offspring in a
hypothetical life-or-death situation? Why, from an inclusive
fitness rationale, are there even, among those, about 14% of
men who consistently save their 40-year-old mates regardless
of their offspring’s age? Why do a few women deviate from the
majority female tendency to save their offspring, particularly
when 25-year-old mates are involved? These and other ques-
tions certainly need further research, which should go beyond
the simple forced-choice methodology used in this study that,
although maintaining ecological validity, is a broad metric to
understand the underlying mechanisms involved in men and
women’s decision-making processes. In this sense, for exam-
ple, the use of reaction time measures might be highly infor-
mative. In addition, future research should also explore how
certain participants’ characteristics such as their involvement
(or not) in a committed relationship at the time of testing, or
their parental status, may influence their responses. Finally, we
think that testing samples of both men and women older than
the ones tested here (e.g., between 30 and 40 years old) would
be particularly helpful to clarify the role of age within this
hypothesis.
Overall, this study reveals at least two interesting findings:
First, the feasibility of the so-called Kundera hypothesis; that
is, the intriguing confirmation that (almost) every woman
would prefer her child to her mate if forced to choose between
one of them in a life-or-death situation, whereas this would not
always be the case for every man (for about 15–30% of them,
depending on the specific dilemma involved in the displayed
life-or-death situations). Hence, we could infer that whereas for
most women (and also most men), an offspring seems “more
irreplaceable” than a mate, for a significant number of men
(and only a few women), just the opposite would be the case.
Not surprisingly, mates and friends have already been typically
pointed out in the literature (e.g., Daly, 2015; Steward-
Williams, 2007, 2008) as two special cases of nonkin relations
that challenge the pervasiveness of altruism toward kin.
Accordingly and secondly, our study seems to reinforce the
idea that “Hamilton’s rule is not a psychological theory” (Buss,
2015, p. 227) by not shaping people’s behavior necessarily and
strictly according to the rationale of inclusive fitness tenets,
neither being immune, like most evolved psychological adap-
tations (Alexander, 1979; Crawford & Anderson, 1989), to the
influence of other variables and, therefore, exhibiting some
“phenotypic” variability among populations (Neyer & Lang,
2003). As suggested by Steward-Williams (2008), “a com-
pletely satisfactory account of nonkin altruism is still lacking”
(p. 414), particularly concerning friends and mates. Hence, a
more comprehensive evolutionary view of altruism, including
both kin and nonkin, should be probably developed in the near
future on the basis of current and further empirical evidence.
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